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ABSTRACT 
For pragmatism, the meaning of a psychological concept or statement is found in its practical implications for human 
affairs.  Absent is any assumption that the concept or statement represents the Truth about a metaphysical Reality that lies 
beyond human experience and behavior.  Behavior analysts embrace pragmatism, and argue that an important consideration in 
psychology is the degree to which a psychological concept or statement contributes to effective action in the laboratory or in 
service delivery.  The effective action commonly takes the form of prediction and control. 
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RESUMO 
Para o pragmatismo, o significado de um conceito ou afirmação psicológica é encontrado em suas implicações práticas 
para os assuntos humanos. Não há qualquer suposição de que o conceito ou afirmação representa a Verdade sobre uma 
Realidade metafísica que está além da experiência e do comportamento humano. Os analistas do comportamento abraçam o 
pragmatismo e argumentam que uma consideração importante na psicologia é o grau em que um conceito ou afirmação 
psicológica contribui para uma ação efetiva no laboratório ou na prestação de serviços. A ação efetiva comumente assume a 
forma de previsão e controle. 
Palavras-chave: pragmatismo, previsão e controle, mentalismo, níveis de análise, neurociência. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
This article is taken from material I developed over the years to help in my own teaching on the topic of pragmatism in behavior analysis.  I 
offer it here in the hope others will find it useful. In keeping with the instructional goal of the article, references are at a minimum. In addition, 
both the language and the arguments are more informal than in other articles. If I have fallen short in the execution, I apologize and ask for 
the reader’s tolerance. I can only say the contingencies haven’t finished with me yet. Correspondence concerning the article should be 
addressed to the author at jcm@uwm.edu, or at his home address:  1861 E. Fox Lane; Fox Point, WI 53217; USA. 
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BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND PRAGMATISM 
Pragmatism is an orientation in philosophy, although 
its implications extend to other forms of intellectual activity. 
The present article is concerned with its implications for a 
science of behavior. 
In simple terms, pragmatism holds that the meaning 
and value of concepts and statements are most usefully 
assessed in terms of their practical consequences in the world 
of human affairs, such as the extent to which they aid 
adaptation. Pragmatism is often contrasted with traditional 
views in which philosophers construct complex metaphysical 
systems in an effort to represent what they take to be the Truth 
about Reality.  Many of the classical philosophers loom large 
in this regard:  Plato, Descartes, Kant.  Pragmatism suggests 
these efforts are misguided.  When the concepts and 
statements are scientific, pragmatism argues that their 
meaning and value are a matter of what they imply for 
effective interaction with nature, commonly through 
prediction and control. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRAGMATISM 
Pragmatism has a long history.  For example, the 
English polymath Francis Bacon (1623/1937) is sometimes 
credited with pragmatic thinking when he argued in favor of 
science as fundamentally concerned with “shaping nature as 
on an anvil” (p. 413) and achieving outcomes that benefit 
humans through direct, practical action.  Similarly, the great 
Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1886/1959) 
once said, “The ways even of science still lead to the mouth” 
(p. 23).   In more modern times, many important American 
thinkers in the late 1800s and early 1900s who were active in 
both psychology and philosophy are regarded as pragmatists.  
Two such thinkers are John Dewey (e.g., 1896) and William 
James (e.g., 1892).  As an illustration, we note that James 
emphasized “All natural sciences aim at practical prediction 
and control and in none of them is this more the case than 
psychology to-day” (p.  148).  James went on to argue that 
what “every educator, every asylum superintendent, asks of 
psychology is practical rules” that will help these 
professionals to improve the ideas, dispositions, and conduct 
of people in their charge (p. 148).  In a similar vein, the two 
opening sentences of Watson’s (1913) “behaviorist 
manifesto” are well known:  “Psychology as the behaviorist 
views it is a purely objective branch of natural science.  Its 
theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior” (p. 
158).  Here we can see that very early in the analysis of 
scientific thinking, the value of a scientific statement was 
assessed in terms of its contribution to effective action, such 
as prediction and control. 
Although B. F. Skinner was an experimental 
psychologist rather than a philosopher, much of his work also 
embraced pragmatism.  One example is when Skinner (1974) 
said that “Scientific knowledge is verbal behavior….  It is a 
corpus of rules for effective action…  [A] proposition is true 
to the extent that with its help the listener responds effectively 
to the situation it describes” (pp. 241-242).  This passage 
indicates that Skinner subscribed to a pragmatic conception 
of science that emphasized how humans might interact 
effectively with the world, rather than to the traditional 
conception of Truth and Knowledge as some representation 
of a metaphysical reality. 
 
PRAGMATISM VS TRADITIONAL VIEWS:  
PREDICTION AND CONTROL 
Many traditional views of scientific knowledge do 
recognize the technological importance of prediction and 
control, but nevertheless argue that genuine scientific 
knowledge consists of contemplative statements about 
theoretical mechanisms or structures that supposedly underlie 
observations (Smith, 1992).  To this end, laws, equations, and 
models are regarded as the highest form of scientific 
knowledge, insofar as they are held to reflect the operating 
characteristics of the underlying theoretical mechanisms or 
structures.  Control is seen as a pedestrian engineering 
problem that follows from how to apply the contemplative 
forms of genuine scientific knowledge. 
To be sure, these matters are complex.  For example, 
a traditional and a pragmatic view of science may not differ 
as much as a traditional view supposes.  Much of the 
discussion turns on the role of prediction:  Is it a formal 
property of an explanatory system, or is it important for 
pragmatic reasons?  Although traditional views emphasize its 
formal properties, Skinner (1953) emphasized the pragmatic 
importance of prediction in the following way: 
The scientific “system,” like the law, is designed to 
enable us to handle a subject matter more efficiently.  What 
we call the scientific conception of a thing is not passive 
knowledge.  Science is not concerned with contemplation.  
When we have discovered the laws which govern a part of the 
world about us, we are then ready to deal effectively with that 
part of the world.  By predicting the occurrence of an event 
we are able to prepare for it.  By arranging conditions in ways 
specified by the laws of a system, we not only predict, we 
control; we “cause” an event to occur or to assume certain 
characteristics.  (pp. 13-14) 
Similarly, a theoretical model may inform efforts to 
predict and control by identifying ranges of interventions that 
might be undertaken, or ranges of effects that might be 
expected from a given intervention.  Our point here is that on 
a pragmatic reading, what appears as a distinct, alternative 
view may be seen as directly relevant to a pragmatic view of 
scientific knowledge. 
 
WHY IS PRAGMATISM NOT SIMPLY 
INSTRUMENTALISM? 
A topic that is nominally related to pragmatism is 
instrumentalism.  Instrumentalism is the thesis in traditional 
views that one of the goals of science is simply to propose 
concepts that will generate testable predictions.  When these 
concepts are verified through research, they become 
incorporated into the theory that is the ultimate goal of 
science.  On this view, scientists need not be concerned with 
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the origins of the concepts.  The origins might lie in the insight 
of the scientist, but in any case their origins are incidental to 
their verification and their role in theory building. 
Behavior analysts understand that pragmatism and 
instrumentalism overlap in some sense, but behavior analysts 
suggest pragmatism goes further than instrumentalism by 
arguing that if some concept generates testable and verifiable 
predictions, the important question is the basis by which it 
does so.  The origin of the concept cannot be so easily set 
aside, as it is in instrumentalism.  Rather, behavior analysts 
ask, What variables and relations does the concept take into 
account?  How are these variables to be manipulated to 
produce a desired end?  These questions follow directly from 
a behavioral account of the sources of scientific verbal 
behavior, rather than a traditional account in terms of 
reference and symbolism.  Clarification and refinement of the 
sources of the verbal behavior will enhance their contribution.  
Instrumentalism stops short of asking these pragmatic 
questions.  Thus, for behavior analysts pragmatism is not 
equivalent or reducible to instrumentalism. 
 
PRAGMATISM AND CLINICAL VERSUS 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
We may further note that scientists and researchers 
sometimes distinguish between (a) effect size and clinical 
significance, on the one hand; and (b) p-value and statistical 
significance in null-hypothesis testing, on the other.  
According to this distinction, some research findings might 
be clinically significant and inform manipulations that have 
the desired practical effect, and these findings may be usefully 
distinguished from others that might be statistically 
significant but fall short of yielding effects that are of 
sufficient magnitude to be important for practical reasons.  
When scientists and researchers make these distinctions, they 
are surely making a pragmatic distinction about how research 
might identify effective manipulations.  Behavior analysts 
emphasize the importance of this distinction, and emphasize 
the clinical, rather than statistical significance of findings 
whenever possible. 
 
PRAGMATISM AND THE RELATION BETWEEN 
NEUROSCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
To see further implications of pragmatic 
considerations in psychology, we may examine three 
controversial matters: (a) the relation between 
neuroscience and the study of behavior-environment 
relations, (b) levels of analysis—the molar versus 
molecular question, and (c) the relation between mentalism 
and behavior analysis (e.g., Moore, 2016).  With regard to 
the first matter, many traditional researchers and theorists 
argue that some form of behavior hasn’t been truly 
explained until some physiological mechanism that 
underlies the behavior has been identified.  On a pragmatic 
view, we note that this argument is a metaphysical claim 
about what True Knowledge and True Explanation consist 
of.  So conceived, the argument is inconsistent with a 
pragmatic orientation. To say we know something is to say 
that we can behave effectively in one circumstance or 
another.  To say we have explained some form of behavior 
is to say we have identified the variables and relations of 
which it is a function and by which we might control it.  
For example, we can make the behavior appear or 
disappear on command, with the properties and rate or 
probability we wish.  In principle, we might be able to 
predict and control behavior through either (a) a 
physiological intervention, such as by administering a pill 
or an injection; or (b) an environmental intervention, such 
as by manipulating a contingency of reinforcement.  The 
specific intervention we employ might depend on the 
resources available to us at the time and in the setting we 
want to predict and control.  Obviously, our choice of an 
intervention also depends on our level of knowledge about 
the behavior in question.  At present we are a long way 
from having a level of knowledge that facilitates this sort 
of effective physiological intervention.  Our point here is 
perhaps abstract:  either form of intervention—
physiological or environmental—may achieve the desired 
end, and no one form is privileged by being the 
foundational basis for the other.  Rather, our choice is a 
matter of practical considerations (e.g., Skinner, 1974, p. 
221). 
 
PRAGMATISM AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
The second matter—the appropriate level of 
analysis for our knowledge claims in psychology—also 
entails practical considerations.  It is an empirical matter 
whether a given class of behavior that we wish to 
influence, say by making the behavior more probable if it 
is currently deficient or less probable if it is excessive, is a 
function of events, variables, and relations at the large 
scale, molar level, or at the reduced scale, molecular level.  
Behavior analysts emphasize it is useful for scientists to 
remain sensitive to this question.  Our methods will reveal 
the answer, such as through controlled research in the 
laboratory or functional analyses in applied settings.  A 
priori claims that we should work only at one or the other 
level because that level reflects the metaphysically True or 
Real level will not provide the answer. 
 
PRAGMATISM AND THE RELATION BETWEEN 
MENTALISM AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
The third matter concerns the relation between 
mentalism and behavior analysis.  We note that behavior 
analysts are opposed to mentalism.  On a pragmatic 
interpretation, the opposition to mentalism is based on the 
view that mental theories and explanations do not promote 
effective prediction and control.  Why?  For behavior 
analysts, mental theories and explanations are largely 
ineffective at prediction and control because they generally 
regard the origin of mental variables as autonomous and 
not a function of behavioral contingencies and selection at 
the levels of phylogeny, ontogeny, and the culture.  The 
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source of control over mentalistic verbal behavior lies in 
social-cultural tradition, reification, and mischievous 
metaphors, rather than observations of ongoing processes 
and generic extensions of our descriptions. Predictions 
derived from mental theories and explanations may 
sometimes appear to be accurate, and therefore to be 
useful, but for behavior analysts, their utility follows from 
the way they incorporate behavioral contingencies and 
selection—albeit implicitly—at the levels of phylogeny, 
ontogeny, and the culture, rather than the way they 
incorporate mental variables that are argued to be 
epistemologically superior to behavioral variables. 
In a similar vein, we may examine behavior 
analytic objections to mentalism that say mental structures 
and mechanisms don’t actually exist and therefore 
shouldn’t be included in psychological theories and 
explanations.  If we as behavior analysts argue in this way, 
we risk being unpragmatic and violating one of our guiding 
principles.  When we make such claims, we are talking 
metaphysically, not different in principle from a mentalist 
who argues that mental structures and mechanisms 
obviously do exist and therefore must be included in 
psychological theories and explanations.  Again, at issue is 
the extent to which a scientific statement contributes to 
prediction and control.  Yes, mental statements don’t 
contribute very much to prediction and control.  
Chomsky’s theory of language doesn’t do much to help 
speech pathologists teach children with impoverished 
verbal repertoires to strengthen their verbal repertoires.  
Rather, we may understandably want to employ the most 
effective theories and explanations.  These are behavioral 
theories and explanations.  It is sufficient to say they are to 
be preferred because they promote better prediction and 
control and to avoid debates about ontology about which 
there is likely to be no resolution. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, by adopting a pragmatic orientation, 
behavior analysts may become better scientists, practitioners, 
and indeed citizens, all of which enable behavior analysts to 
better contribute to the important world of human affairs and 
human welfare. 
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